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HOW STORIES MAKE US SMARTER
Narrative theory and cognitive semiotics
David Herman‘
1. Introduction
In everyday life people incorporate stories into a wide range of
activities. Stories enable humans to carry out spontaneous
conversations, make sense of news reports in a variety of media,
produce and interpret literary texts, create and assess medical case
histories, and provide testimony in court. In the present essay, I build
on the interdisciplinary research tradition that has grown up around
the study of “cognitive artifacts”2 -that is, material as well as mental
1 English Department, North Carolina State University.
2 D. HERMAN, “Framed narratives and distributed cognition” (under review);
D. HERMAN, “Stories as a tool for thinking”, in D. HERMAN (ed.), Narrative Theory
and the Cognitive Sciences (under review) ; D. HERMAN and B. CHILDS, Narrative
and Cognition in Beowulf Style (forthcoming) ; E. HUTC1-IINS, Cognition in the
Wild, Cambridge, Ma, MIT Press, 1995 ; E. I-IUTCHLNS, “How a cockpit remembers
its speeds”, Cognitive Science, n° 19, 1995, pp. 265-288 ; E. HUTCHINS, “Cognitive
artifacts”, in R.A. WILSON and F.C. KEIL (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the
Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge, Ma, MIT Press, 1999, pp. 126-128 ;
D.A. NORMAN, Things That Make Us Smart, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley,
1993; B. SHORE, Culture in Mind .' Cognition, Culture and the Problem of
Meaning, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.
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objects that enable or enhance cognition- in an effort to account for
the pervasiveness of stories as a resource for problem solving. The
program for inquiry outlined here, with its dual focus on narrative
viewed as a semiotic system and on the cognitive representations and
processes supported by that system, also works to situate narrative
theory within the broader enterprise of cognitive semiotics.
The basis for my approach can be traced back to Lev Vygotsky’s
concept of “psychological tools”1. For Vygotsky, such tools include,
among other semiotic systems, “‘language, various systems for
counting ; mnemonic techniques ; algebraic symbol systems ; works
of art ; writing ; schemes, diagrams, maps, and mechanical drawings ;
all sorts of conventional signs; and so on”’2. Later researchers in
fields ranging from developmental psychology3 to cognitive
anthropology (e.g., Hutchins’and Shore’s work) have built on
Vygotsky’s ideas, which stress the social mediation of thought. From
a Vygotskyean perspective, individual mental functioning is a form of
activity continuous with and premised upon social activity, because
the psychological tools needed for thought grow out of social
institutions and also out of interactions with others. My argument is
that narrative, too, can be characterized as a (socially embedded)
psychological tool or cognitive artifact. -
Blending insights from several areas of inquiry, including
narratology, discourse analysis, phenomenology, and artificial
intelligence, I use as case studies two literary texts that afford
narratives of transformation : Apuleius’s The Golden Ass (2nd century
CE)‘ and Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis (l9l5)5. Both of these
narratives explore the problem of identity over time, and thus how to
reconcile constancy and change, stability and flux. Along the way,
Apuleius’s and Kafka’s texts suggest how stories provide important
1 L.S. VYGOTSKY, Mind in Society." The Development of Higher Ps_vchologir.'al
Process, M. Cora, V. Joan-Sraman, S. SCRIBNER and E. Souannmm (eds.),
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, l978.
Quoted in J. WERTSCH, Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind, Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 79.
3 B. ROGOFF, Apprenticeship in Thinking : Cognitive Development in Social Context,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1990
4 APULEIUS, The Golden Ass, trans. Jack Lindsay, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1962.
5 F. KAPKA, Die Verwandlung, in Gesammelte Sehriften, Bd I, Ei'zéil1lungen and
lcleine Prosa, 2d ed., M. BROD (ed.), New York, Schocken Books, 1946, pp. 69-
l30; F. KAFKA, The Metamorphosis, trans. S. Corngold, New York, Bantam
Books, 1986.
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representational tools for humans —~tools that facilitate a number of
problem-solving activities. Moreover, despite their surface similarity,
these two stories of transformation reveal considerable variability in
the way narrative can be exploited as a tool for thinking, suggesting
that its prevalence as a means for cognition stems from its essential
flexibility, its adaptability vis-:21-vis the most diverse objects,
situations, and events. By comparing and contrasting how Apuleius’s
and Kafka’s texts bear on five core problem-solving abilities, I hope
to provide a blueprint for further research on stories as a resource for
cognition. Although the present paper draws on literary data to make
its case, my aim is to sketch out a theoretical model that will be
applicable to the full range of narrative subtypes, including stories
told during face-to-face interaction‘, films, computer-mediated
narratives, nonliterary narratives in print, and so on.
2. Five problem-solving activities supported
by narrative
In this section I detail the five (overlapping) problem-solving
activities for which, arguably, the representational tools bound up
with narrative furnish crucial support. The problem-solving activities
at issue include “chunking” experience into workable segments,
imputing causal relations between events, managing problems with
the “typification” of phenomena, sequencing behaviors, and
distributing intelligence across groups. One of my working
assumptions is that theorists can gain insight into narrative as process
by studying instituted narrative products, in the same way that
linguists arrive at hypotheses concerning the human language faculty
by studying attested linguistic behavior. Thus my overall aim is to
characterize Apuleius’s and Kafka’s accounts of transformation as
tools for problem solving in their own right, but also to characterize
the more general representational processes that subtend and make
possible all such narrative accountings.
1 Cf. D. HERMAN, Framed narratives and distributed cognition, op. cit.
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2.1. “Chunking” experience into workable segments
From early on, the notion of “chunking” —i.e., the process by
which the stream of experience is segmented into units that are
bounded, classifiable, and thus more readily recognized and
remembered— has played an important role in cognitive-scientific
research. For instance, what Marvin Minsky‘ called frames, or
structures for representing and remembering stereotypical situations
(e.g., being in a classroom or an art gallery), constitute a means of
organizing knowledge of the world into discrete, manageable chunks.
It is easier to organize knowledge and behavior if the vast realms of
experience are subdivided ; indeed, the world would quickly become
unmanageable if I had to sort through every possible concept and
potential course of action at every given moment. Minsky’s idea of
frames was designed to explain how knowing what one typically does
when in a classroom can be separated from knowing what one
typically does in an art gallery. That way, one can avoid staring at a
school desk as if it were a sculpture by Archipenko and, inversely,
refrain from using a piece of chalk to annotate a Renaissance painting
in a museum.
Likewise, narrative affords representational tools for addressing
the problem of how to chunk the ongoing stream of experience into
bounded, cognizable, and thus usable structures. Stories organize
experience by enabling people to select from among the total set of
sequentially and concurrently available inputs; preprocess those
inputs into internally differentiated chunks with (as Aristotle? put it) a
beginning, middle, and end ; and then use those temporally structured
segments as a basis for further cognitive operations on new
experiential inputs. Indeed, by marking off a point on the temporal
continuum and assigning it the role of origin or beginning, decisions
about where to begin a story not only constrain the design and
interpretation of the narrative itself, but also index competing ways of
understanding the world ~i.e., altemative strategies for tracing current
states of affairs back to a point of origin. By the same token, narrative
is a resource for closure. Any particular telling of a narrative has to
1 M. MINSKY, “A framework for representing knowledge”, in P. WINSTON (ed.), The
Psychology ofComputer Vision, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1975, pp. 211-277.
2 H. ADAMS (ed.), ARISTOTLE, Poetics. Critical Theory Since Platon, San Diego,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971, pp. 48—-66.
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end, even if the narrative being told is presented as unfinished or
unfinishable.
2.2. Imputing causal relations between events
As I discuss in subsequent sections of this essay, both Apuleius’s
and Kaﬂ<a’s narratives focus on the problem of how something can be
identified as “the same” entity despite changes over time. To establish
identity over time, producers and interpreters of narrative must use a
cause-and-effect algorithm to map storyworld occurrences onto more
or less radical changes in the nature, appearance, or behavior of
participants in the situations and events being recounted. Indeed,
given that narrative prototypically roots itself in causal-chronological
relations—in sequences of happenings in which earlier happenings are
at least causally necessary for, though not fully determinative of, later
ones‘ —the problem of identity over time would seem to be one for
which stories are ideally suited. Narrative can be construed as both
reflecting and supporting a cognitive predisposition to find causal
links between entities, states, and events in a sequentially presented
array.
2.3. Managing problems with the “typification” of
phenomena
Under this heading, I include ways in which stories provide tools
for solving the problem of how to balance expectations against
outcomes, general patterns against particular instances—in short, the
typical against the actual. Bruner discusses related issues under the
rubric of “canonicity and breach,” noting that “to be worth telling, a
tale must be about how an implicit canonical script has been breached,
violated, or deviated from in a manner to do violence to... the
“legitimacy” of the canonical script”? In this connection, Alfred
Schutz’s concept of typification—his notion that “[a]ll our knowledge
of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking,
involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalizations,
1 N. CARROLL, “On the narrative connexion”, in W. VAN PEER and S. CHATMAN, New
Perspectives on Narrating Perspective, Albany, SUNY Press, 2001, pp. 2l~4l.
2 J . BRUNER, “The narrative construction of reality”, Critical Inquiry, n° 18, 1991,
p. ll.
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formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought
organization“ —can be brought productively into play.
For Schutz, human beings
have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of
common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is
these thought objects which determine their behavior, define
the goal of their action, the means available for attaining them
-in brief, which help them find their bearings within their
natural and socio-cultural environment and to come to terms
with itz.
From this perspective, typification facilitates a broad variety of
cognitive tasks——from the organization of objects into classes and
members-of-classes, to the learning of the lexical and syntactic
patterns of a language, to the ascription of motives to others during
social interaction-i. If assimilated to pre-existent types, any
encountered object, situation, or event can be placed within a “horizon
of familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship which is, as such, just taken
for granted until further notice as the unquestioned, though at any
time questionable stock of knowledge at hand. The unquestioned pre-
experiences are. . .at hand as typical, that is, as carrying open horizons
of anticipated similar experiences“.
Crucially, stories fill the breach when typification fails; in line
with Bruner’s5 remarks about transgressions of canonicity, narrative is
a means of redressing problems that arise when anticipated similar
experiences do not materialize. More than this, however, stories can
be told prior to or in the absence of any real failure of expectation, in
order to question the explanatory limits of expectation-inducing and
-sustaining typifications. Indeed, when juxtaposed with Bruner’s
ideas, Schutz’s account suggests that the concept of typification
actually encompasses two, rather different processing strategies
supported by narrative. On the one hand, stories can be used to engage
1 A. SCHUTZ, “Common-sense and the scientific interpretation of human action”, in
M. NATANSON (ed.), Collected Papers, vol. 1, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962,
p. 5. .
2 Ib:'d., p. 6 ; L. LANDGREBE (ed.), E. HUSSERL, Experience and Judgement, trans.
J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, I973,
pp. 321-338.
3 A. SCHUTZ, op. cir., pp. 7-23.
4 1bid., p. 7.
5 J. BRUNER, op. cit.
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in “problem-raising,” i.e., to throw into relief ways in which situations
and events depart from the typical or the expected. On the other hand,
received stories about the world provide a context of typicality in
terms of which unexpected occurrences can be interpreted, enabling
various modes of problem-solving. Section 5 below explores ways in
which Kafka’s and Apuleius’s texts at once detach themselves from
and anchor themselves in dominant typification practices ——thereby
facilitating both problem-raising and problem»-solving —--but do so in
distinct ways thanks to their very different contexts of production,
generic profiles, and thematic foci.
2.4. Sequencing behaviors _
What exactly should one do, where, when, and in what order ?
As intractable as it sometimes seems, this too is a problem for whose
solution narrative provides important tools. When it comes to stories,
the problem manifests itself at two different levels : at the level of
narrative communication, and also at the level of the storyworldsl that
get constructed and reconstructed during narrative communication.
2.4.1. Narrative and communicative behavior
On the one hand, stories help organize the turn~taking behavior
of the parties engaged in narrative communication --whether in the
context of face-to-face interaction or that of reading a literary
narrative. As Mary Louise Pratt noted, in both “natural” and literary
narrative the role structure of participants in the speech situation
remains similarly marked vis-a-vis “the unmarked situation among
peers, in which all participants have [in principle] equal access to the
floor”? Apuleius’s' and Kafka’s readers, like a storyteller’s
interlocutor(s), assume the role of an audience ceding its floor rights
to discourse producers who must as a result live up to “increased
expectations of delight”3. In both settings, in other words, there is an
overall preference for a current speaker’s tum at talk to continue, and
1 D. HERMAN, Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative, Lincoln,
University of Nebraska Press, 2002, pp. 9~l'l.
2 M.L. PRATT, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse, Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1977, p. 113.
3 rm, p. 116.
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a dispreference for potential next speakers to truncate that tum by
self-selecting. In the case of literary narratives, requests for such
extended turns can be accomplished by a variety of textual as well as
paratextual cues, e.g., the startling first sentence of Kafka’s narrative
or the publication of a story in a volume containing other texts by the
author or by other fiction writers. In this sense, producers and
interpreters of literary narrative are caught up in a sociointeractional
nexus that remains anchored at essential points to the communicative
dynamics of face-to-face storytelling‘. .
2.4.2. Narrative representations ofbehavior
On the other hand, narratives also support the sequencing of
behaviors by modeling, in the storyworlds they encode, what, how,
where, and when a particular course of action can or should be
pursued. This representational function can accrue to storyworlds no
matter what their modality status, whether fictional, actual, or
indeterminate. Hence commentators as diverse as Horace, Samuel
Johnson, and Tipper Gore have assumed the power of fictional worlds
to impinge on —provide models for- actual human conduct.
But this aspect of stories viewed as a tool for thinking can be
studied more microanalytically, suggesting ways narrative provides
templates for behavior in physical as well as moral-~cultural worlds.
For example, stories typically feature a protagonist orienting herself in
space as well as time. In this respect, narratives of all sorts can
function to support human navigational abilities, representing how
agents might pursue a particular trajectory through a complex,
dynamically emergent spatial environment. Putting the same point
another way, narrative supports “cognitive mapping”, i.e., the process
by which things and events are mentally modeled as being located
somewhere in the world.
I D. HERMAN, “Story logic in conversational and literary narratives”, Narrative, n° 9-
2, 2001, pp. 130-137 ; IDEM, “Toward a transrnedial naratology”, in M.~L. RYAN
(ed.), Narrative across Media .' The Languages of Storytelling, Lincoln, University
of Nebraska Press (forthcoming).
2 R.M. DOWNS and D. STEA, Maps in Minds : Reflections on Cognitive Mapping,
New York, Harper and Row, 1977 ; P. GOULD and R. WHITE, Mental Maps, 2nd
ed., Boston, Allen and Uwin, 1986 ; D. HERMAN, “Spatial reference in narrative
domains, TEXT, n° 21-4, 2002, pp. 515-541 ; S. OSTROFF, “Maps on my past : Race,
space, and place in the life stories of Washington D.C. area teenagers”, Oral
History Review, n° 22, 1995, pp. 33-53.
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2.5. Distributing intelligence across groups
Narrative at once reﬂects and reinforces the supra-individual
nature of intelligence--—i.e., the inextricable interconnection between
trying to make sense of and being within an environment that extends
beyond the self‘. Grasping this self-environment nexus means
thinking against the grain of explanatory schemes that posit a central,
controlling intelligence that stands out like a foreground against a
backgrounded context for mental and other forms of activity. What is
required instead is some concept of agents—within-an-environment —a
“molar” notion greater than the sum of its “molecular” components»-
to explain how individual as well as collective cognitive processes are
organized? Narrative, arguably, is at once a vehicle for and target of
such distributed cognition, which is enabled by the shared
construction and revision of stories, but which also evenmares in the
fashioning and refashioning of accounts of how the world is, might
be, or should be. By the same token, the methods and stakes of
narrative theory change when the object of analysis is neither tellers,
nor tales, nor interpreters of tales, but rather the combined product of
all of these factors bearing on stories viewed as a resource for
collaborative problem-solving.
3. Stories as a source of structure : transformation
and chunking in Apuleius and Kafka
I turn now from my general account of the five problem domains
to a comparison and contrast of how Apuleius’s and Kafka’s texts
bear on each domain. The present section explores how stories can be
viewed a source of structure in humans’ (shared) attempts to make
sense of experience. More specifically, it examines how stories of
transformation afford a means of chunking experience into (more or
less) bounded, cognizable segments in both Apuleius and Kafka.
1 J. GIBSON, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston, Houghton-
Mifﬂin, 1979 ; E. ROSCH, “<<If you depict a bird, give it space to ﬂy» : Eastern
psychologies, the arts, and self-knowledge”, SzrbSrance, n° 94/95, pp. 236-253.
2 J . WERTSCH, Mind as Action, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-
21 ; cf. L. VYGOTSKY, Mind in Society : The Developemenl of Higher
Psychological Processes, op. cir.
142 ,_ , DAVIDIIERMAN __
3.1. The functions of (reversible) metamorphoses in
Apuleius
Lucius, the narrator of The Golden Ass, undergoes a
transformation from human to animal, before being re-transformed
from ass to human thanks to the intervention of the goddess Isis. In
addition, this “Milesian tale” contains multiple embedded narratives
involving a variety of literal as well as figurative metamorphoses—-
including shapeshifts from human to animal, and from mortal to god.
The theme of transformation thus provides the “glue” connecting the
various anecdotes and tales to the frame provided by Lucius’s
odyssey.
More than this, the one-way and two-way metamorphoses in
Apuleius’s text furnish a way of segmenting the stream of events into
bounded structures each with an inception and a terminus, or rather a
source state and a target state which are, respectively, the initiation
and the end-point of the transformative process. In other words, tales
of transformations extract from time’s flow a definite span of events,
providing a source of structure for understanding other, analogous
event-spans. Relevant in this context is Mark Turner’s* notion of
“parabolic projection”, whereby a familiar source story is projected
onto happenings in the world in order to make sense of those
happenings. Specifically, in Apuleius, transformation is the template
used for assigning change-of-state predicates to participants in the
narrated world—for tracking identities-in-fluxz. Even the most radical
changes of state (from human to ass, from the hairs of goats to
dancing wineskins animated by magic) can be made sense of in terms
of metamorphosis. Experience can be chunked into spans of time
during which Entity X acquires, displays, and then loses predicates,
instead of being encountered as an undifferentiated stream without
beginning, middle, or end. The difference is that between a world in
which a finite number of entities undergo changes emergent in time
1 M. TURNER, The Literary Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
2 G. BROWN, Speakers, Listeners ans Communication : Explorations in Discourse
Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995 ; G. BROWN and G. YULE,
Discourse Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983 ; C. EMMOTT,
Narrative Comprehension .' A Discourse Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1997.
How STORIES MAKE us SMARTER, , _14_s
and an innumerable set of successively presented entities, between
which no real conceptual links can be established.
3.2. Gregor’s cataclysmic and irreversible transformation
In Kafka, the tale of Gregor Samsa’s transformation from
travelling salesman to dung beetle structures and delimits the stream
of experience in a different way. Readers are privy only to the end-
point of the metamorphic process. Further, there is no suggestion in
the story that a two-way transformation —~from human to insect and
from insect back to human—~ is within the sphere of possibility.
Whereas Apuleius represents metamorphosis as a durative process,
capable of being reversed, Kafka represents Gregor’s transformation
as instantaneous, cataclysmic, and final.
Unlike Lucius’s, Gregor’s is a post~Freudian world in which
difficult-to-interpret legacies of past trauma live on in the present and
jeopardize the future. Transformations of the self can be traced back
to these traumatic hinge points, but there can be no moving back
beyond the intervening mediations of time, language, and experience
to arrive at an original trauma that must instead be hypothesized as
given. Rather than trafficking in transformative processes with a
beginning, middle, and end, with the end-point sometimes coinciding
with a reverse metamorphosis back to the pre-transformed self,
experience is structured into a before that is radically distinct from
and inaccessible to the after-time of the present. (Hence, Gregor loses
consciousness when, in a version of the primal scene, his mother
embraces his father in complete union with him and pleads for her
son’s life‘). This tale of transformation still constitutes a source of
structure ; but in a manner paralleling the use of the concept of “half-
lives” by Kafka’s compatriot and successor, Milan Kundera, Gregor’s
existence is segmented into that of an earlier self that, for the self of
the present, figures as only a fading memory?
For both Apuleius and Kafka, then, tales of metamorphosis
afford a means of chunking the stream of experience into pre- and
post-transformation segments or phases. However, the two narratives
ascribe different modes and degrees of interconnectedness between
i F. KAFKA, op. cit., p. 39.
2 See P.STE1NER, “Ironies of history: The Joke of Milan Kundera”, C.-
A. MIHAILESCU and W. HARMANEH (eds), Fiction Updated: Theories of
Fictionality, Narratology, and Poetics, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996.
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the source and target phases that are the input and output of the
transformative process, respectively. Apuleius’s and Kafka’s texts
thus recruit from a common stock of representational resources —a
stock grounded in narrative viewed as a cognitive style as well as a
discourse genre— but they draw on those resources in distinctive ways
and with distinctive results.
4. Narrative, transformation, and causality
This section further explores how narratives of transformation
support humans’ efforts to structure and comprehend their experience.
Specifically, it characterizes “transformation” and “causality” as
interlinked notions, but suggests that different kinds of metamorphic
narratives cue interpreters to impute different sorts of causal relations
between events. Conversely, different species of causality are the
hallmark of different genres within the same historical epoch, as well
as indexing changes in narrative technique across historical periods.
4.1. Metamorphoses as effects of actions in Apuleius
Apuleius’ tales of transformation represent those metamorphoses
as more or less durative processes triggered by attitudes and actions of
characters. In other words, the narratives of transformation situate the
characters in causal networks, whereby cause-and-effect relationships
can be established between actions and occurrences that might
otherwise figure as localized or isolated incidents. Lucius is
transformed into an ass because of his overweening curiosity about
magic, and a re-transformation becomes possible only when that
inquisitiveness gives way to faith in Isis, who then appears to Lucius
in a vision and tells him how to become human again. The goat-hairs
taken by Fotis are transformed into dancing wineskins through the
magical practices of her employer, Pamphile ; and the debacle that
results for Lucius is in turn the effect of Fotis’s attempt to deceive
Pamphile, who wanted to turn human hairs into lovers for herself.
Through Cupid’s intervention with Jupiter, Psyche is transformed into
a deity —after she, like Lucius, learns the hard way about the dangers
of unbridled curiosity. Hence, in Apuleius, story-enabled
representations of metamorphosis are not only a way of carving
structure out of the stream of experience, but also a way of operating
_ _ 7 HOW STORIES US SMARTER __,__ _1__1¢i5
on that structure to create coherent episodes, in which states, events,
and actions are bound together causally to create unified wholes.
4.2. The difficulty of discerning a cause for Gregor’s change
Meanwhile, by segmenting Gregor’s existence into a span of
years leading up to his metamorphosis and a span of months
following it, Kafka’s tale of transformation enables different sorts of
causal linkage. In effect, interpretation of Kaﬂ<a’s text prompts the
search for two independent cause-and-effect algorithms, ranging over
different elements of the narrative. One algorithm is of the same sort
used to interpret The Golden Ass as a series of (interconnected)
episodes. In the early pages of the story, readers construe the
backpedaling of the office manager into the vestibule as an effect of
his horror at Gregor’s new appearance and of his eagemess to escape
the apartment. Later, when Gregor clings to the picture on the wall of
his room and glares defiantly at his sister and mother, attributing to
Gregor the motive of hanging on to his human past allows this action
to be integrated into the larger attempted-furniture-removal episode in
which it occurs.
But the narrative also cues the search for a different species of
causal linkage~—one that would connect Gregor’s current condition
and activities to the situations and events that preceded his insectoid
change. Whereas the causal links between Gregor’s and his family
members’ local actions are readily discovered, Kafka frustrates the
search for more global cause-and-effect relations between Gregor’s
past and present. Is Gregor’s current mode of existence a l_iteralization
of the life he led more figuratively before, as mere “vermin” for his
family -“particularly for his father ? Did the treatment he received
from his family “cause” his change, in this sense ‘? Or did
superfamilial forces contribute to his metamorphosis as well— for
example, the constant distrust of his supervisors at work, or Gregor’s
decline from the proud demeanor he wore as a member of the
military, to the civilian obscurity of his later years, when his free time
is spent framing pictures cut out of magazines ? Or do these and other
factors jointly conspire to effectuate Gregor’s change ? The exact
causal mechanism is, of course, left underspecified.
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5. Transformation and typification
Both of the texts under study suggest how narrative is not only a
resource drawn upon when the limits of more or less dominant
typifications are exposed, but also a strategy for building new and
different typifications, with stories then serving a re-typifying or
rather meta-typifying function. In particular, both The Golden Ass and
The Metamorphosis question the coherence of standard membership
criteria for the classes “human” and “animal.” But they do so in
different ways and, arguably, with different consequences.
5.1. Transformation and typification in Apuleius
Building on the precedents set by ancient Greek myth and by
Ovid, Apuleius’s Milesian tale begins from the premise that the
boundary between the human and animal worlds is porous rather than
impermeable. Not only does Pamphile use her magical arts to occupy
the form of an owl, and Fotis misuse magic to bring about Lucius’s
metamorphosis into an ass. More than this, the possibility of such
shapeshifts figures as a generalized condition of existence. In the
embedded narrative by Aristomenes that occurs early in the text,
Aristomenes’ friend Socrates stresses the supernatural powers of
Meroe, the tavemkeeper with whom he has consorted. She changed
one lover into a beaver, a rival tavem owner into a croaking frog, and
a lawyer into a homed ram, butting and rebutting in a different way
than previously. Later on, in telling the story of his night-watch over a
corpse, Telephron recounts the deceptive practices of Thessalian
wise-women. Telephron is warned by the man who hires him : “these
abandoned slidder-skins can change themselves into any beast and
creep up so secretly as to cheat the eyes of the Sun and of Justice as
soon as to look at you. They disguise themselves as birds, and
sometimes as dogs or mice or even --true it is-~ as flies”l. Given that
humans can either voluntarily or willy-nilly assume the form of
beavers, birds, frogs, and ﬂies, the distinction between human and
animal must be retypified as gradient and fuzzy rather than binary and
clear-cut.
1 APULEIUS, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
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It is hard to determine which of these two ways of typifying the
human-animal relation was actually more robust during the culture
and period in which the pagan Apuleius wrote. Greek and Roman
mythology relied crucially, of course, on all sorts of metamorphoses,
and in the century before Apuleius, Ovid had used shapeshifts to
question and repudiate an Augustan emphasis on order —to dissolve
the fixed hierarchies of Virgil’s Rome-centered epic, for example,
into a mosaic of transformations, a blending of kinds and categories.
But in Apuleius’s case, debatably, human-animal blends are yoked to
a different overall purpose. True, Lucius’s ass’s-eye perspective
enables him to witness firsthand the deplorable conditions in which
slaves were kept, thereby exposing the dark underbelly of the Roman
Empire. Insofar as the trajectory of the narrative leads towards
Lucius’s conversion to the priesthood of Isis and then Osiris,
however, the tale’s human-animal interchanges can be viewed as an
instrument for questioning the relation between the spiritual and
material realms. Reminding humans of their proximity to and even
interchangeability with animals, the text suggests the need for
reorganizing human behavior around new typifications —typifications
that would enable humans to detach themselves more effectively from
the material world to which they remain all too bound. In that way,
they, like Lucius, might more successfully aspire to the immaterial
world of the gods.
5.2. Transformation and typification in Kafka
Kafka’s text also involves a blending _of types or kinds, such that
the categories “human” and “insect” must likewise be viewed as
located on a continuum rather than separated by an absolute divide.
However, Kafka’s 1915 narrative was written in the wake of Freud’s
theories about the consciousness-disrupting Id as the repository of
humans’ “archaic heritage”. The story also came in the midst of the
global conflict of WWI, when modern technological advancements
were put in service of combatants irrational in their disregard for
human life and their refusal to learn from history. Thus, although
Kafka’s text parallels Apuleius in forcing a retypfication of
experience -—a rethinking of the division of “human” and “animal” into
natural kinds- The Metamorphosis prompts interpreters to move in
the opposite direction along the human-animal continuum.
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In other words, The Metamorphosis suggests the need to
reorganize human behavior around the recognition that human beings
are irreducibly embedded in concrete, material circumstances--—that
humans share with animals and insects not only the same overarching
environment but also the same sorts of drives, anxieties, and aims.
The story reveals the need for a retypification of experience such that
people see themselves as more, not less, firmly anchored in the
material reality of their bodies, their physical environments, their
material constraints. From the very inception of Kaﬂ<a’s story, Gregor
is bound to learn the new constraints imposed by his dung-beetle’s
body —what portion of his carapace is most vulnerable, what to make
of his itchy white spots, how best to use his thin, multiple legs, which
disposition of objects in space makes him feel the most at ease.
Whereas Lucius is a human temporarily condemned to an ass’s form,
Gregor is a dung-beetle with an ever dimmer memory of the
experience of being human. Lucius craves the same old foods and
imposes his old moral standards on others; Gregor finds himself
repulsed by what he used to like to eat and at times has to struggle to
remember the exact familial connection between himself and his
mother and sister. The Golden Ass takes both Lucius and the reader on
a journey toward purification and de-materialization ; The
Metamorphosis leads toward the putrefaction and then dessication of
Gregor’s wasted body. Indeed, the family’s growing neglect of their
son and brother stems in part from their failure to retypify the human-
animal nexus in the way that Kafka’s protagonist and readers are
forced to do as the story proceeds.
6. Sequencing behaviors : communicative
and representational protocols
6.1. Communicative protocols in Apuleius and Kafka
In its form as well as it themes, The Golden. Ass bears the
stigmata of spoken narrative -of the classical world’s equivalent of
folk tales. Although Apuleius’s Milesian tale contains multiple
embedded narratives, whose intradiegetic narrators sometimes tell
stories about characters who in turn tell stories, thus evoking hypo-
hypodiegetic narratives, shifts between all these diegetic levels are
clearly and explicitly marked. Thus, Aristomenes prefaces his story
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about Socrates and Meroe with the comment that “I’11 be pleased to
begin my story all over again for you [Lucius]”‘, and Lucius cues the
reader to “pop” this embedded narrative off the stack of diegetic
levels by remarking “[hlere ended the tale of Aristomenes”2. The
inclusion of these level-indicating devices is a reflex of the text’s
origins in oral traditions, where storytellers are under an imperative to
mark shifts between levels, participants, and time-frames with as little
ambiguity as possible, so that recipients can construct on—the-fly
interpretations of what is being communicated by narrators. Without
benefit of a written text, interlocutors rely on such cues to coordinate
their interpretive activities, i.e., to fashion the appropriate mental
models for situations and events recounted in particular stretches of
the narrative.
Kafka’s tale, though perhaps farther removed from folk-tale
traditions, likewise differs from the communicative imperatives of
conversational storytelling in degree rather than kind. The story’s first
sentence functions much like what William Labov3 described as the
“abstracts” used in conversational narratives, pre-announcing the
subject of the tale and signalling the need for an extended “turn at
talk” to convey what happened : “When Gregor Samsa woke up one
morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed in his bed
into a monstrous vermin”“. Yet this textual cue triggers a mode of
communicative behavior that is not tantamount to activity on the part
of the teller and passivity on the part of an interlocutor (or group of
interlocutors). Instead, literary texts like Kafka’s require a dovetailing
of sequencing strategies by interpreters as well as producers of
narrative. All parties must actively enable the production of the
narrative via an intercalated sequence of behaviors performed and
behaviors withheld.
6.2. Representational protocols in Apuleius and Kafka
What is more, The Golden. Ass and The Metamorphosis furnish
representational protocols for the sequencing of behaviors. For
1 Ib:'d., p. 34
2 rm, p. 44.
3 W. LABOV, “The transformation of experience in narrative syntax”, in Language in
the Inner City, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972, pp. 354-396.
4 F. KAFKA, op. cit, p. 3.
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example, both Lucius and Gregor Samsa are represented as following
paths of motion through a range of spatial environments. Lucius
begins his journey travelling toward Thessaly, then navigates the city
of Hypata to find his host’s house as well as the house of a famous
magician, then follows the paths prescribed for him by his various
owners when Lucius becomes an ass. For its part, Kafka’s tale
furnishes highly microanalytic representations of Gregor’s
movements to and fro through the Samsas’ apartment —for example,
Gregor’s initial struggle to identify and follow a path from his bed
through his bedroom door into the living room, or his circuitous,
multi-legged ﬂight from the revenge-minded father. More generally,
an important difference between types of story artifacts is the relative
degree of detail attaching to their representations of characters’
manners and paths of motion as they unfold in time and space‘.
Perhaps because Gregor’s sphere of movement is more narrowly
circumscribed than Lucius’s, his manner of motion receives more
meticulous attention in Kafka, whereas Apuleius, recounting an epic
journey of sorts, charts a richer variety of paths of motion.
7. Distributing intelligence : from monads
to societies
Marvin Minsky? describes the workings of intelligence in terms
of a society of mind. Intelligence, in other words, is socially
distributed, such that a group or team of experts is “smarter” than any
one individual could ever be. More than this, though, intelligence is
distributed not just socially, but also between humans and non-
humans—i.e., between people and artifacts. Another way of putting
this would be to say that intelligence must be characterized in terms of
functional gestalts in which intelligence is distributed between two or
more agents (whether human, computational, or other) making a
coordinated effort to come to grips with a problem in their
environment —via a complex interweaving of individual and shared
1 L. TALMY, “Lexicalization patterns: Semantic structure in lexical forms”, in
T. SHOPEN (ed.), Language Typology and Syntactic Description, vol. 3, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 57-149 ; D. HERMAN, “Toward a
transmedial narratology”, op. cit.
2 M. MINSKY, The Society ofMind, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1986.
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representations‘. As both Apuleius’s and Kafka’s texts suggest,
narrative provides an optimal environment in which to synthesize and
propagate multiple representational states; stories thus afford a
cognitive and communicative context supporting the shift from
monads to societies as the essence of intelligence.
Narrative helps distribute intelligence by facilitating more or less
sustained and far-reaching blends between the individual and his or
her environment. Described by Erving Goffmanz as a fundamental
resource for ‘laminating’ experience -that is, a tool for embedding
imagined or noncurrent scenarios within a current context of talk-
stories also afford a basis for various forms of imaginative projection,
including those required for empathetic identification with others. It is
not just that, by narrating the experiences of fictional characters,
writers like Apuleius and Kafka can extend the focus of concern to
places, times, events, and participants beyond those that lie within
their own or their interpreters’ personal acquaintance. Further,
building on their understanding of the “social mind in action”3, i.e.,
drawing on the same sociocognitive processes of attribution they use
to make inferences about their cohorts’ unstated feelings, motives,
and dispositions, readers of literary narrative have no trouble
accepting the fiction writer’s premise that other minds can be dipped
into, reported on, even quoted verbatimi —whether by a homodiegetic
or first-person narrator vastly different from his earlier self, or by a
heterodiegetic or third-person narrator capable of probing the fears
and aspirations of a dung-beetle.
In characterizing stories as an instrument for distributing
intelligence, one thereby shifts from the individual mind to the
narrative situation as the primary unit of analysis. If thinking can be
characterized in temis of a functional gestalt in which tools, tasks, and
1 In the same vein, Hutchins (E. HUTCHINS, Cognition in the Wild, op. cit.) defines
cognition as computation taken in a broad sense —such that the idea of
“computation” is “as applicable to events that involve the interaction of humans
with artifacts and with other humans as it is to events that are entirely internal to
individual persons... For our purposes, ‘computation’ will be taken... to refer to
the propagation of representational state[s] across representational media” (p. l l8).
2 E. GOFFMAN, Frame Analysis : An Essay an the Organization of Experience, New
York, Harper and Row, 1974 ; IDEM, Forms of Talk, Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1981.
3 A. PALMER, “The construction of fictional minds”, Narrative, n° 10, 2002, pp. 28-
46. .
4 Cf. D. COHN, Transparent Minds : Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness,
Princeton, Princeton Universty Press, 1978.
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users are less basic than the larger whole in which they jointly
participate, in the case of stories, too, tellers, tales, and interpreters of
tellings are less basic than the transpersonal narrative situation which
they collectively constitute. Apuleius represents the telling and
interpreting of stories as the mechanism by which knowledge of the
past as well as the present is transmitted. Kafka uses figural narration‘
to blur the boundary between the narrator’s telling and Gregor’s
experiencing of the metamorphosis. In this way, the form of the tale
enables the propagation of representational states across a society of
minds and furthermore suggests the inextricable link between
narration and knowledge. Thus, whether consciously or not, both
authors root their texts in the etymological heritage of the very term
narrative, which derives from a Sanskrit root meaning “to know.”
8. Conclusion
The approach outlined here provides a framework for studying
how stories enhance core problem-solving abilities in a variety of
communicative contexts, nonliterary as well as literary. While
sketching basic and general principles by virtue of which narrative
supports human understanding, my approach also suggests that those
principles are implemented differently in different kinds of story
artifacts, and even within stories ostensibly falling under the same
descriptive category (e.g. “narratives of transformation”). Future
research, drawing on the work of theorists in a number of fields, needs
to continue this investigation, exploring how various kinds of
narrative practice vehiculate intelligence in various ways.
At stake are differences in how specific instantiations of the
semiotic system of narrative support cognitive representations and
processes. Ethnographic, sociolinguistic, and communication-
theoretic research may suggest how those differences can be
correlated with the variable functions of stories across distinct
cultural, subcultural, and situational settings. Relevant, too, is work in
developmental psychology and applied linguisticsz ; this research
bears on age-graded differences in how stories are used by children
1 F.K. STANZEL, Theory ofhlarrarive, trans. Ch. Goedsche, Cambridge, Cambidge
University Press, 1984.
2 Cf. E. OCHS and L. CAPPS, Living Narrative : Creating Lives in Everyday
Storytelling, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2001.
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more or less fully apprenticed in their culture’s, subculture’s, and
family’s narrative practices. Comparative media studies, meanwhile,
may reveal medium-specific constraints and enablements when it
comes to the cognition-boosting power of stories. In turn, this
necessarily interdisciplinary program for research -»~a program for
studying how stories are woven into the very fabric of intelligent
behavior— constitutes an important subdomain of cognitive semiotics.
